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Executive summary
Concern is growing in the European Union that a rapprochement between Russia 
and China could have negative implications for the EU. We argue that energy relations 
between the EU and Russia and between China and Russia influence each other. We analyse 
their interactions in terms of four areas: oil and gas trading, electricity exchanges, energy 
technology exports and energy investments. 
We discuss five key hypotheses that describe the likely developments in these four areas 
in the next decade and their potential impact on Europe:
1. There is no direct competition between the EU and China for Russian oil and gas;
2. China and the EU both have an interest in curbing excessive Russian energy rents;
3. The EU, Russia and China compete on the global energy technology market, but specialise 
in different technologies;
4. Intercontinental electricity exchange is unlikely;
5. Russia seems more worried about Chinese energy investments with strategic/political 
goals, than about EU investments.
We find no evidence of a negative spillover for the EU from the developing Russia-China 
energy relationship.But, eventually, if these risks – and in particular the risk of structural 
financial disintermediation – do materialise, central banks would have various instruments to 
counter them.
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1 Introduction
Energy is a key area for cooperation between the European Union and Russia, and between 
China and Russia. These bilateral relationships influence each other and each relationship 
is of strategic interest to the respective third party, with potential spillovers that present risks 
and opportunities. In principle, there are four main areas of cross-border energy relations: 
hydrocarbon trading, energy technology trading, electricity trading and foreign energy sector 
investments. We discuss five key hypotheses that describe a likely development in these four 
areas in the next decade and their potential impact on Europe:
1. There is no direct competition between the EU and China for Russian oil and gas;
2. China and the EU both have an interest in curbing excessive Russian energy rents;
3. The EU, Russia and China compete on the global energy technology market, but specialise 
in different technologies;
4. Intercontinental electricity exchange is unlikely;
5. Russia seems more worried about Chinese energy investments with strategic/political 
goals, than about EU investments.
The speed of energy-sector decarbonisation in China, Russia and the EU, and the way it is 
done, will also be key drivers of future bilateral energy relationships. If the EU choses to focus 
on full electrification of energy consumption using domestice renewables by the middle of 
the century, hydrocarbon trading relationships will become irrelevant. But if the EU decides 
to rely heavily on imports of ‘clean’ fuels from Russia, such as synthetic fuels1, existing hydro-
carbon trading patterns might be perpetuated. The volatility in the domestic debates on the 
speed of energy-sector decarbonisation and the right approach to it makes it very difficult to 
forecast developments in energy relations over the longer term2. This Policy Contribution thus 
focuses on the next ten to 15 years.
2 There is no direct competition between 
the EU and China for Russian oil and gas
Oil and gas exports continue to be the backbone of Russia’s economy. In 2018 they accounted 
for 59 percent3 of the total value of Russia’s exports and represented 46 percent4 of Russia’s 
total federal revenues. On the other side, in 2018, 70 percent of Russian natural gas exports 
went to the EU, while 15 percent of Russian oil exports went to China5. For China and the EU, 
energy imports from Russia are significant. In 2018, according to Eurostat, 27.3 percent of the 
EU’s total oil imports and 40.2 percent of its total gas imports came from Russia. Meanwhile, 
Russian oil accounted for 15.4 percent6 of China’s total oil imports (Russia’s share of China’s 
total gas imports is only 1 percent).
1 This can for example be hydrogen or methanol. BDI (2018), for example, includes a scenario in which Germany 
alone will import 340 terawatt hours of synthetic fuels, which is equivalent to more than 60 percent of current 
German electricity demand.
2 See Tables 1 and 2 in Zachmann and Marcu (2018).
3 Sources: https://wits.worldbank.org/ and https://oec.world/en/.
4 Author’s calculations based on data provided by the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation (see http://
www.eeg.ru/pages/580).
5 Figures are author’s calculations based on data in BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2019.
6 Author’s calculation based on data in BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2019.
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Figure 1: Russian gas exports (billions of cubic metres)
Source: Bruegel based on BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2009 and 2019 editions, and Central Bank of the Russian Federation. 
Note: LNG = liquefied natural gas.
Figure 2: Russian oil exports in millions of tonnes
Sources: Bruegel based on Eurostat, Central Bank of the Russian Federation, https://oec.world/en/ and BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy 2018.
There is a concern in the EU that greater cooperation between Russia and China on energy 
could be detrimental to the EU’s energy interests. For example, if Russia becomes less reliant 
on the EU as a destination for its energy exports, Russia might become more assertive in 
energy negotiations and also political negotiations7. Russia’s leadership has highlighted on 
various occasions the increasing importance of China for the Russian energy sector. But is 
such a shift realistic and would it be a problem for the EU?
Only about 10 percent of Russian oil exports go via direct pipelines to the EU. Another 10 
percent goes already via pipelines to China8. In the oil market, it is already largely possible for 
Russia to ship all its oil to China via the sea route. But this would involve high transport costs, 
and refineries in China are not optimised for Russian oil grades. At the same time, the impact 
on the EU would be manageable because China would then have to import less oil from other 
countries – allowing the EU to buy elsewhere, though with higher transport costs and with 
some intra-European disruption (refineries in the east might become less competitive relative 
7 We cannot explore the logic behind current observed and potential Russian gas and oil projects as they are often a 
complex combination of foreign-policy objectives (such as forging alliances), economic motives (such as linking 
new sources to new consumers) and internal distributional motives (such as providing rents for powerful stake-
holders).
8 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_Siberia%E2%80%93Pacific_Ocean_oil_pipeline.
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to refineries on the coast). This seems therefore to be a relatively symmetric lose-lose scenario 
without much strategic value for either side. 
For gas, the story is more complicated. Russia’s pipeline infrastructure is still largely 
directed towards the EU – and this would change only slowly. Of Russia’s gas exports, 68 per-
cent goes through pipelines to the EU9. Russia currently has only one gas pipeline to China. 
And in terms of projects under construction, the Gazprom10 projects to supply the EU (Nord 
Stream 2: 55 billion cubic metres (bcm) and Turkstream: 31 bcm11) have greater capacity 
than the China-leaning projects (Power of Siberia: 38 bcm12). Europe continues to be a much 
more attractive market for Russia with existing pipeline infrastructure (345 bcm per year (EIA, 
2019)), better developed resources13 and higher prices14. Connecting the West Siberian fields 
to China would be very expensive and time consuming. Consequently, it appears likely that 
the bulk of gas exports to China, if they increase, will not be drawn from fields in Western 
Siberia. Furthermore, China so far has not given gas-import projects from Russia any prefer-
ential treatment, but seems to have commercially exploited Russia’s eagerness to diversify its 
export portfolio by pushing through a very low gas price15.
It is expected that by 2040, Chinese demand for gas imports – currently at about a fifth 
of the EU’s – will increase drastically, despite significantly increasing domestic production. 
According to the IEA (2018) new policies scenario, Chinese demand will be equivalent to 
more than half of the EU’s gas import demand by 2040 (Figure 3), while according to the BP 
(2019) scenario, Chinese import demand would even surpass the EU’s import demand16. 
In this context, it is actually more surprising that Russia continues to expand its currently 
under-utilised gas delivery capacity to the EU at a faster pace than pipelines to China. 
Figure 3: EU/China gas import demand, million tonnes of oil equivalent
Source: Bruegel based on gas production and consumption in the new policies scenario by the IEA (2018). Note: EU production includes 
Norway. * = estimated.
9 Author’s calculation based on data in BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2019.
10 Gazprom has a state monopoly over gas exports via pipeline.
11 Additional branches of both projects are at time of writing being discussed.
12 There some more distant projects such as Power of Siberia II with 38 bcm.
13 Reserves in East Siberian fields, which would be closer to China, are estimated to be 3510 bcm, while gas reserves 
in West Siberian fields, which can be connected easily to existing pipeline systems to the EU, are 31,685 bcm. 
14 China so far has not exploited Russia’s political commitment to the pivot by seeking commercial concessions and 
negotiating a gas contract that would arguably allow the Power of Siberia-pipeline only to break-even at oil-prices 
above $100/barrel (see https://www.europeangashub.com/wp-content/uploads/attach_688.pdf).
15 See StopFake.org, ‘Gazprom promises China a supply of natural gas it cannot deliver’, 18 October 2018, available at 
https://www.stopfake.org/en/gazprom-promises-china-a-supply-of-natural-gas-it-cannot-deliver.
16 Author’s calculation based on data in BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2019.
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Box 1: Competition for central Asian gas between EU, Russia and China
Central Asia has significant gas reserves, in particular in Turkmenistan (19,000 bcm), Azer-
baijan (2,100 bcm), Kazakhstan (1,000 bcm) and Uzbekistan (1,200 bcm)17. Russia, China 
and the EU are interested in tapping into these resources. In the past, Russia was the only 
country connected via pipeline to Central Asia. It used its exclusive access to manage the 
price and volume of exports from the region. China broke this monopoly by building the 55 
bcm Central Asia-China gas pipeline to Turkmenistan in 2009. Currently Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan provide nearly 40 percent of China’s total gas imports through this pipeline. An 
additional pipeline from Turkmenistan to China (‘Line D’ bypassing Kazakhstan by going 
through Kyrgyzstan) was announced in 201318. But in 2019 Russia’s Gazprom – somewhat 
surprisingly – began buying gas from Turkmenistan, securing gas volumes that Turkmeni-
stan could otherwise export to China19. 
The EU has also been trying to gain access to the region’s resources, while avoiding 
reliance on existing or planned Russian pipelines. The Transcaspian pipeline would bring 
Central Asian gas to Azerbaijan from where it could potentially flow to the EU through the 
Southern Gas Corridor. Russia has so far been able to block this project. One main stumbling 
block – the legal status of the Caspian Sea – was resolved in 2018, but Russia and Iran contin-
ue to indicate that they will not make it easy for such a project to go ahead quickly. 
It thus appears more likely that any collision of energy interests in Central Asia will involve 
Russia and China, rather than China and the EU (which infrastructure-wise will be largely 
kept out of the region, unless there are some at time of writing unlikely developments in Iran-
EU relations).
As Russia in principle holds sufficient reserves to satisfy both Chinese and EU import 
demands for many decades, there will be no competition for Russian reserves. Furthermore, 
the increasingly liquid market for shipments of liquified natural gas (LNG) would counteract 
any future Russian strategy of depriving the EU market of gas and oversaturating the Chinese 
market20. As for oil, the result would be no shortage in the EU, but an expensive re-routing of 
international LNG routes, which would hurt Russia and the EU equally. 
In summary, Russia has enough oil and gas reserves to supply both the mature European 
market and the developing Chinese market. Increasing its oil and gas exports to China will 
not strengthen Russia’s position in negotiations over gas supplies to the EU because Russia 
cannot credibly threaten to divert volumes from the European market to the Asian market. By 
contrast, the EU should carefully assess how to manage the risks associated with an increas-
ing share of Russian gas in its gas imports.
17 Author’s calculations based on data in BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2019.
18 Michael Lelyveld, ‘China’s Gas Supplies Shadowed By Stalled Pipeline – Analysis’, Eurasia Review, 25 June 2019, 
available at https://www.eurasiareview.com/25062019-chinas-gas-supplies-shadowed-by-stalled-pipeline-analy-
sis/.
19 We cannot say whether this is just a way for Gazprom to meet its supply obligations or a move to limit direct Cen-
tral Asian exports to China.
20 This would require a massive build-up of Russian-Chinese pipeline connections (in total about four times the 
length and four times the diameter of the €10 billion Nord Stream II project), which would be very expensive and 
time-consuming.
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Figure 4: Main gas reserves and cross-border pipeline systems in Eurasia
Source: Bruegel.
3 China and the EU have an interest in 
curbing excessive Russian energy rents
Russia is a dominant gas and oil supplier to the EU. In the gas market, Russia has exercised its 
market power in various ways to prevent competition and achieve higher prices. Measures 
include various interventions (including export taxes, export monopoly, dominance of state-
owned enterprises, control over foreign investments and preventing independent pipeline 
transit from Central Asia), specific infrastructure investments (in pipelines and storage) and 
pricing strategies (such as price discrimination between countries and predatory pricing). 
In the oil market, Russia has played a major role in allowing the Organisation of the Petro-
leum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to coordinate supply cuts to stabilise global oil prices since 
201621. The Russian government was, for example, able to convince companies to observe 
production limits22.
Such an approach implies higher oil and gas prices (compared to a properly competitive 
market) for both the EU and China, and thus a transfer of welfare from the importers to the 
exporters. The EU and China therefore have an interest in mitigating Russia’s market power in 
the oil and gas markets. 
If China and the EU could convince Russia to open its exploration and production sector 
to foreign companies and to allow them to export in a non-discriminatory way, energy costs 
for China and the EU could be substantially reduced. The welfare transfer out of Russia could 
be mitigated by non-discriminatory export taxes, while true competition on the production 
side could bring down production costs and completely remove the detrimental impact of 
inefficient state companies.
21 OPEC, ‘OPEC and non-OPEC Ministerial Meeting’, press release 25/2016, 10 December 2016, Organisation of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries, available at https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/press_room/3944.htm.
22 Vladimir Soldatkin, ‘Russian oil output down in February, misses global deal target’, Reuters, 2 March 2019, 
available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-oil-opec-russia/russian-oil-output-down-in-february-misses-glob-
al-deal-target-idUSKCN1QJ04T.
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4 The EU, Russia and China compete on the 
global energy technology market, but 
specialise in different technologies
The EU, Russia and China all export energy technology to one another and to the rest of 
the world (Figure 5). China has been very successful in exporting coal-fired power plants. 
Since 2010, it has invested $45.5 billion in the coal sector and $3.8 billion23 in the solar sector 
abroad. The photovoltaic (PV) panel industry also plays an important role for China: in 2018, 
the total value of PV products exported was $16.1 billion24. This success has been accompa-
nied by foreign complaints about unfair trade practices – and has even led the EU to imple-
ment temporary protective measures on photovoltaic panels25. So far, China’s wind and nucle-
ar industries remain focused on its growing domestic market26.
Figure 5: Energy technology exports, shares of global exports (2018)
Source: UN Comtrade. Note: Aggregation performed by Harmonised System Code. Solar PV panels (854140); wind technology (850231, 
730820); nuclear technology (840110, 840120, 840140); fossil-fuel technology (841990, 841181, 841199, 841182, 841950, 840420).
Russia remains one of the big players in the export of nuclear power plants. Russia has 
even secured important projects in the EU (Hungary) and China27. Since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, Russia has constructed nine nuclear power plants abroad: in Ukraine (2), Iran 
23 See ‘China’s global energy finance’, database, Boston University, available at https://www.bu.edu/cgef/#/all/Ener-
gySource/Coal. 
24 Liu Yuanyuan, ‘Chinese Solar Manufacturers Increased Production, Export in 2018 While Domestic Installations 
Fell’, Renewable Energy World, 2 April 2019, available at https://www.renewableenergyworld.com/2019/02/04/chi-
nese-solar-manufacturers-increased-production-export-in-2018-while-domestic-installations-fell.
25 The EU imposed anti-dumping tariffs on Chinese solar panels in 2013, lifting them in 2018 (see http://trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1904). As a result, in the first half of 2019, China’s photovoltaic exports 
increased to $9 billion (see Vincent Shaw, ‘Chinese solar production figures continue to ramp up’, PV Magazine, 
26 July 2019, available at https://www.pv-magazine.com/2019/07/26/chinese-solar-production-figures-contin-
ue-to-ramp-up/).
26 “China is the world’s largest wind power market in both new and cumulative installations. In 2018, the country 
installed 20.2 GW of onshore wind energy and 1.6 GW of offshore wind farm, representing 44% and 37% of global 
market share respectively.” See Evwind, ‘China is the world’s largest wind power market’, 14 August 2019, available 
at https://www.evwind.es/2019/08/14/china-is-the-worlds-largest-wind-power-market/68449. In 2018 China 
installed seven nuclear power units (8.8 GW), out of nine units installed globally.
27 Global Construction Review, ‘Russian reactors in China: Rosatom signs deal to deliver two VVER units in Liaon-
ing’, 10 June 2019, available at http://www.globalconstructionreview.com/news/russian-reactors-china-rosa-
tom-signs-deal-deliver-/.
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(1), China (4) and India (2) (World Nuclear Association, 2019). A further seven are under 
construction and 11 have been contracted (World Nuclear Association, 2019). In other energy 
technologies Russia remains largely limited to post-Soviet markets.
EU energy technology exports are very diverse. Wind and gas turbines, network infrastruc-
ture and energy management systems are some of the EU’s strengths. But the EU has become 
less competitive on global markets for coal, nuclear and photovoltaic plants. 
Consequently, the competition between Russia, China and the EU on the global market for 
electricity supply technologies is less a competition over where a certain type of technology 
(eg PV panels) comes from (typically China), but rather over choices about what technology is 
installed (for example, a Russian nuclear reactor or a European wind park). 
5 Intercontinental electricity exchange is 
unlikely
Russia in 2018 exported about four terawatt hours (TWh) to the Baltic countries, eight TWh 
to Finland and three TWh to China28. Together, these exports only represented a little over 1 
percent of Russian electricity production (1100 TWh)29.
One exciting prospect for China-Russia-EU collaboration would be the opportunity to 
transmit electricity from one end of the Eurasian landmass to the other. With high shares of 
renewables it would in principle be very attractive if wind-power from the Atlantic and Pacific 
coasts, solar power from Central Asia and hydropower from Siberia could be pooled together 
to ensure more stable electricity supply. 
The Russian power grid already covers 10 time zones and is interlinked with 15 countries 
(forming the Integrated Power System). Interconnecting this huge grid in synchronous or 
asynchronous30 mode with the EU continental power system (Entso-E) has been discussed 
and studied in the past (UCTE, 2008), but currently it seems more likely that EU countries (the 
Baltic states) and non-EU countries (Ukraine, Moldova) that are still linked to the Integrated 
Power System will synchronise with the European power system. In the east, high-voltage 
direct current connections (ie without synchronisation) between China and its northern 
neighbours are under discussion31.
The Russian network would need to be substantially strengthened to carry significant 
intercontinental flows. Currently, for example, electricity flows between the European Russia 
and Urals price zone and the Siberia price zone within Russia are constrained, leading to 
persistent price differences between the two zones. And east-west transmission bottlenecks 
in some parts of Asian Russia only allow electricity equivalent to the generation from a 
single coal-fired power plant to be transmitted in one direction or the other (Pipkin, 2016). 
Consequently, even strong interconnectors between Russia and China together with the full 
synchronisation of Russia and the EU would not imply significant intercontinental electricity 
exchanges unless intra-Russian transmission is substantially strengthened.
An alternative that has been discussed in the EU (see for example JRC, 2017) and China 
28 These are net exports. See SO-UPS (2019).
29 Currently, electric power is transmitted from Russia to China through three alternating current lines (two 220 and 
one 110 kV lines) and one direct current line (500 kV).
30 Synchronisation implies that two alternating current transmission systems are run as one system with the same 
frequency at each point of the system. Asynchronous connection of two alternating current transmission systems 
is established by converting the alternating current of one system into direct current and then converting this 
direct current again into alternating current with the frequency of the other system.
31 JRC (2017) noted: “One such initiative is the Northeast Asia Power Grid Interconnection (NEAG) which aims at link-
ing the north-eastern Asian countries by a high voltage power grid. The planned network consists of 12 EHV/UHV 
DC interconnections sized at 800 kV and 8-10 GW with distances of 200-2300 km.”
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(for example the Global Energy Interconnection Development and Cooperation Organisation, 
https://en.geidco.org/) is a dedicated intercontinental supergrid. Instead of coupling existing 
alternating current transmission systems, a new dedicated direct current system would be 
constructed. The JRC (2017) proposal foresees a 4-10 gigawatt connection over a distance of 
5600 kilometres, costing some €15 billion. This would imply that such a line would only be 
commercially viable either if capital costs are very low or the price differentials between the 
EU and China would be high in most hours32. Current price pointers for China (which only 
feature regional experimental markets such as Guangdong) and the EU (where we use the 
German wholesale electricity price (EEX) that is also relevant for most of Germany’s neigh-
bours) indicate that price differentials at the same moment can be quite small (Figure 6). 
Consequently, on a commercial basis, a dedicated intercontinental electricity system seems 
rather unlikely, unless the cost of these systems drops dramatically, or high and persistent 
price differentials emerge.
Figure 6: Hourly electricity prices for the same moment in EU and China (€/Mwh)
Source: Bruegel based on data provided by The Sino-German Energy Partnership and EEX Group. Note: data for 16 May 2019. Times are 
Central European Summertime.
Therefore, in terms of electricity-system development, increased continental integration be-
tween western Russia and the EU and eastern Russia and China seems the most cost efficient, 
while intercontinental electricity exchanges will likely remain limited.
6 Russia seems more worried about Chinese 
energy investment with strategic/political 
goals, than about EU investment 
EU-based companies are important players in the Russian energy sector. Uniper, Enel and 
Fortum are among the largest electricity producers in Russia; BP owns a 19.75 percent share 
of the world’s largest oil producer Rosneft, and many major EU oil and gas players (including 
Shell, Eni, Total, OMV and Wintershall DEA) are engaged in exploration and production joint 
ventures in Russia. EU energy technology companies including ABB, Siemens and Schneider 
Electric make and sell energy technology in Russia. 
Involvement of EU companies in Russia seems, however, carefully guided by the Russian 
side. Participation in oil and gas production projects appears to be contingent on joint ven-
32 At 5 gigawatts, a 5 percent interest rate and 10 percent losses and 100 percent utilisation, absolute price differen-
tials must average €20/megawatt hour to pay only for the capital cost.
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tures with Russian companies (with strong connections to the state). Activity in the electricity 
sector is – as in all countries – largely driven by the regulatory framework. For EU companies 
that play by these rules, activity appears in general to be very profitable. It has been argued 
that Western money was a helpful disciplining device contributing to the modernisation of 
Russian economic policy, and that the decline of investment from the West was followed by a 
deterioration of the business climate33.
Chinese investments in Russia focus on the mineral extraction sector34 and lag foreign 
trade flows35. Chinese investment is dominated by a few big transactions in oil and gas explo-
ration, the single largest example being the liquified natural gas export projects implemented 
by Chinese companies jointly with Novatek36. Moreover, some other major FDI projects that 
have been announced have so far not materialised. Chinese investment in Russia appears 
much more politicised than European investment, with state-owned Chinese companies 
investing in heavily government regulated sectors in Russia. 
Therefore, reviving the old idea that Europe could offer Russia a partnership for mod-
ernisation while China would make Russia into an ancillary supplier of raw materials, will 
likely attract the interest of the Russian economic elite. It seems plausible, for example, that 
investment by private European companies in the Russian energy sector will have more pos-
itive spillovers (in terms of know-how and the general business climate) than investments by 
Chinese state-owned enterprises. 
7 Conclusion
In the interconnected energy world, unilateral actions and bilateral relationships have an im-
pact on third parties. EU-Russia energy collaboration remains dominated by Russian gas and 
oil exports to the EU. The emergence of China will not dramatically alter this picture. Russia’s 
reliance on oil and gas exports to the EU and China continues to increase. However, given 
Russia’s huge resources, the globalising energy market and the trend away from fossil fuels, 
there is little competition between the EU and China for Russian resources. This implies that 
the Russian pivot to Asia in terms of energy exports is likely to continue but with limited neg-
ative consequences for the EU. However, both the EU and China have an interest in reducing 
Russian pricing power over oil and gas. As hydrocarbon markets are essentially global, the EU 
and China are on the same side.
Economic opportunities are currently more limited in terms of connecting the power 
systems. For this to happen, substantial technical and political challenges would have to be 
overcome, and the benefits remain limited because the individual systems are already today 
quite large and diversified. 
There is strong competition between Russia, China and the EU on the global energy tech-
nology market. Currently, this competition is less about which of the three delivers a certain 
type of equipment (eg a coal plant), but whether one technology that Europe is good at, or 
another that China is good at, is being deployed.
There is competition between the EU and China for the Russian energy market. China has 
so far remained relatively restrained and has mainly focused on upstream oil and gas projects. 
33 “Western money is not doing the talking in Moscow these days, so it seems, paradoxically, that by imposing sanctions 
on Russia the U.S. and its allies may have whittled away an instrument of leverage they once had.” See Nicholas 
Trickett, ‘Russia’s FDI Outlook Grim, with No Chinese Rescue in Sight’, Russia Matters, 11 July 2019, available at 
https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/russias-fdi-outlook-grim-no-chinese-rescue-sight. 
34 Baranova and Porokhova (2017) noted that “mineral resource sectors comprise about 68% of the total implemented 
FDI from China into Russia.”
35 Financial flows between Russia and China lag significantly behind foreign trade flows: in 2015-16, China’s share of 
Russian foreign trade turnover was 10.1 percent, while the share of direct investment was as low as 5.4 percent.
36 Source: see footnote 33.
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There is a risk for Russia that isolated investments by Chinese state-owned companies will 
reinforce the trend of Russia becoming a mere resource provider. By contrast, investment by 
European companies has likely led to much more positive spillovers in terms of know-how 
transfer, anchoring reforms that improve the business climate and diversifying the economy. 
But some of those benefits have been lost with the rollback in Russia in recent years of the 
more liberal market environment in which European companies could operate competitively.
Economic relations are already difficult because the EU, Russia and China follow quite 
different economic, legal and regulatory models. The differences are amplified by politically 
motivated EU and Russian economic sanctions and countersanctions, concern about Russian 
use of financial and energy resources for political purposes, and concern about politically 
motivated investment by Chinese companies in strategic sectors in the EU and Russia. 
Economic policy tools including trade and investment agreements or regulatory harmo-
nisation thus come up against their limits in the broader political landscape. These issues 
are beyond the scope of this paper. Within these political framework conditions, there is no 
clear reason for the EU to relinquish a self-interested energy policy that is focused on pushing 
hydrocarbon import prices lower, exporting EU energy technology and making profitable 
investments. Because of shifting and uncertain demand and supply in the energy sector, this 
will be largely based on a transactional approach, rather than long-term strategic alliances.
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